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A. Proofs
LEMMA 2: If f(y) and g(y) are monotone functions, and f ′(y) ∗ g′(y) > 0, then
cov[f(y), g(y)] > 0.
PROOF:
See Schmidt (2003).
LEMMA 1: Define ei ≡ 1
ni
ni∑
t=1
eit. Then κ =
ni
1 + (ni − 1)ρ , and
κi =
ni
1 + (ni − 1)ρi .
PROOF:
The posterior likelihood in the model is proportional to
L(x|ei) ∝ L(ei|x)L0(x)
∝ exp
−
1
2

x− ei1
x− ei2
...
x− eini

T 
1 ρi · · · ρi
ρi 1 · · · ρi
...
...
. . .
...
ρi ρi · · · 1

−1
x− ei1
x− ei2
...
x− eini


∗ exp
{
−1
2
x2τ
}
= exp
{
−1
2
(
nix
2 − 2x∑nit=1 eit
1 + (ni − 1)ρi + C
)}
∗ exp
{
−1
2
x2τ
}
∝ exp
{
−1
2
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)
1 + (ni − 1)ρi
(
x−
∑ni
t=1 eit
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)
)2}
whereC is constant with respect to x. Thus, defining ei =
1
ni
ni∑
t=1
eit, the posterior belief
of a citizen is distributed according to
(1) N
[
niei
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi) ,
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)
1 + (ni − 1)ρi
]
.
1
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Substituting ρi =
ni − κi
(ni − 1)κi the posterior is given by N
[
κiei
κi+τ
, κi + τ
]
, which is the
same as the posterior that a citizen would have if they received a single signal ei = x+εi,
where the citizen believes εi ∼ N [0, κi]. Finally, note that E[ei] = x, and
var[ei] =
(
1
ni
)2 ni∑
t=1
var[εit] + 2
(
1
ni
)2 ni(ni − 1)
2
cov[εit, εit′ ] =
1
ni
+
ni − 1
ni
ρ.
Thus, ei ∼ N
[
x, ni1+(ni−1)ρ
]
≡ N [x, κ].
PROPOSITION 1:
(i) Overconfidence is increasing with the number of experiences (signals) n.
(ii) The mean ideology in the population, conditional on n, E[Ii|n], is increasing in n
if and only if x > 0, and decreasing in n iff x < 0.
(iii) If ρ is large enough, var[Ii|n] is increasing in n.
PROOF:
A citizen’s overconfidence after ni signals is given by:
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)
1 + (ni − 1)ρi −
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρ)
1 + (ni − 1)ρ > 0 ⇐⇒ ρi < ρ
The difference in overconfidence between the citizen with ni + 1 and ni signals is given
by
ni(ρ− ρi)(2 + (ni − 1)(ρ+ ρi − ρρi))
(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)(1 + niρi)(1 + (ni − 1)ρ)(1 + nρ) > 0
because 0 < ρi < ρ < 1 and ni ≥ 2.
The second and third part follow from Lemma 1: using (1) a citizen’s mean belief is
distributed according to
N
[
nix
ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi) ,
(ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi))2
ni(1 + (ni − 1)ρ)
]
and the difference between the mean of that distribution at ni + 1 and ni is
xτ(1− ρi)
(1 + ni + τ(1 + niρi))(ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi))
which is positive iff x is positive, and negative iff x is negative.
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For the third part, we need to show var[Ii|n+ 1]− var[Ii|n] > 0. That is:
(2)
(ni + 1)(1 + niρ)
(ni + 1 + τ(1 + niρi))2
− ni(1 + (ni − 1)ρ)
(ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi))2 > 0
The LHS of (2) is 0 when:
ρ =
ni(ni + 1)(1 + ρiτ)
2 − (1− ρi)2τ2
ni((ni + 1)(1 + 2τ) + τ2(2 + ρi(ni − 1)(2− ρi)))
The derivative of the LHS of (2) with respect to ρ is
ni((ni + 1)(1 + 2τ) + τ
2(2 + ρi(ni − 1)(2− ρi)))
(ni + 1 + τ(1 + niρi))2(ni + τ(1 + (ni − 1)ρi))2 ≥ 0
Therefore, as long as ρ ≥ ni(ni+1)(1+ρiτ)2−(1−ρi)2τ2
ni((ni+1)(1+2τ)+τ2(2+ρi(ni−1)(2−ρi))) , (2) is satisfied. This will
hold for all n if ρ ≥ 1+ρiτ1+τ(2−ρi) , and, thus, for all ρi if ρ is large.
PROPOSITION 2: Overconfidence and ideological extremeness are positively corre-
lated. This is true conditional on n, and independent of n if ρ is large enough.1
PROOF:
Fix ni = n. Using (1) and the distribution of ei we have that the posterior distribution
of the mean of beliefs of citizens with a given κi is given by
Ei[x]|κi ∼ N
[
κix
τ + κi
, κ
(
τ + κi
κi
)2]
,
where Φ[·] denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Using the fact that
residuals from an OLS regression are orthogonal to regressors we have:
(3) cov[E − E[E|κi], κi] = 0 ⇒ cov[E , κi] = cov[E[E|κi], κi]
Note that Ii|κi = bi + Ei[x|κi] is a sum of two independent random normal variables.
Thus,
I|κi ∼ N
[
µ,
1
σ2
]
.
where µ =
κix
τ + κi
and σ2 =
1
κ
(
κi
τ + κi
)2
+
1
τb
(4)
1Specifically, this holds as long as ρ is large enough that population variance of ideology, conditional on n, var[Ii|n],
is increasing in n—see Proposition 1.
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as E = |I|, E|κi is distributed according to a folded normal distribution, so
(5) E[E|κi] = 2σ φ
[µ
σ
]
+ µ
(
1− 2Φ
[
−µ
σ
])
where φ[·] is the standard normal p.d.f. Taking the derivative of (5) yields:
dE[E|κi]
dκi
=
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
· dσ
dκi
+
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
· dσ
dκi
(6)
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
> 0 and
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
= 1− 2Φ
[
−µ
σ
]
(7)
dσ
dκi
=
1
2σ
√
κ
dσ2
dκi
=
1
2σ
√
κ
τ
(τ + κi)2
> 0 and
dµ
dκi
= x
τ
(τ + κi)2
so clearly the first term in (6) is positive. Note that ∂E[E|κi]∂µ is positive iff x > 0, so the
second term in (6) is ≥ 0. This implies that E[E|κi] is increasing in κi. Lemma 2 then
implies cov[E[E|κi], κi] > 0, and so corr[E , κi] > 0.
For the logic in the previous paragraph to hold in the case when ni ∼ Fn, var[I|n]
must be increasing in n, which is exactly the condition in Implication 2.
PROPOSITION 3: If x > 0 overconfidence and ideology are positively correlated, both
independent of, and conditional on, n.
PROOF:
Following the logic of (3) we have cov[I, κi] = cov[E[I|κi], κi]. E[I|κi] = κixτ+κi .
As this is increasing in κi when x > 0, Lemma 2 implies that corr[I, κi] > 0.
PROPOSITION 4: If x > 0 then cov[E , κi|Ii ≥ 0] > cov[E , κi|Ii ≤ 0] both indepen-
dent of, and conditional on, n.
PROOF:
Fix ni = n, and assume that bi = 0 for all i. (We shall relax this assumption later.) By
the definition of covariance, and as E = |Ii|
cov[Ei, κi|Ii ≥ 0] = E[Iiκi|Ii ≥ 0]− E[Ii|Ii ≥ 0]E[κi|Ii ≥ 0]
cov[Ei, κi|Ii ≤ 0] = E[−Iiκi|Ii ≤ 0]− E[−Ii|Ii ≤ 0]E[κi|Ii ≤ 0]
= −E[Iiκi|Ii ≤ 0] + E[Ii|Ii ≤ 0]E[κi|Ii ≤ 0].
So
(8) cov[E , κi|Ii ≥ 0] > cov[E , κi|Ii ≤ 0]
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holds if and only if
E[Iiκi|Ii ≥ 0]− E[Ii|Ii ≥ 0]E[κi] + E[Iiκi|Ii ≤ 0]− E[Ii|Ii ≤ 0]E[κi] > 0
E[Ii(κi − E[κi])|Ii ≥ 0] + E[Ii(κi − E[κi])|Ii ≤ 0] > 0,(9)
where the first line follows from the definition of covariance, and the fact that sign(Ii) =
sign(ei) and ei⊥κi, which implies that E[κi|Ii ≥ 0] = E[κi|Ii ≤ 0] = E[κi]. It then
follows that (8) holds iff∫ ∞
κ
∫ ∞
0
ei
Pr[Ii ≥ 0]
κi
κi + τ
(κi − E[κi])dFeidFκ
+
∫ ∞
κ
∫ 0
−∞
ei
Pr[Ii ≤ 0]
κi
κi + τ
(κi − E[κi])dFeidFκ > 0
⇐⇒
∫ ∞
κ
κi
κi + τ
(κi − E[κi])
[∫ ∞
0
ei
Pr[Ii ≥ 0]dFei +
∫ 0
−∞
ei
Pr[Ii ≤ 0]dFei
]
dFκ > 0
⇐⇒
∫ ∞
κ
κi
κi + τ
(κi − E[κi])
[
E[ei|ei ≥ 0] + E[ei|ei ≤ 0]
]
dFκ > 0
⇐⇒
[
E[ei|ei ≥ 0] + E[ei|ei ≤ 0]
] ∫ ∞
κ
κi
κi + τ
(κi − E[κi])dFκ > 0
⇐⇒
[
E[ei|ei ≥ 0] + E[ei|ei ≤ 0]
]
cov
[
κi
κi + τ
, κi
]
> 0
where the last line follows by inverting the steps used to get to (9). As κiκi+τ is increasing
in κi, Lemma 2 gives that cov
[
κi
κi+τ
, κi
]
> 0. Thus, (8) holds iff
(10) E[ei|ei ≥ 0] + E[ei|ei ≤ 0] > 0.
ei ∼ N [x, κ] implies
x = Φ[−x√κ]E[ei|ei ≤ 0] +
(
1− Φ[− x√κ])E[ei|ei ≥ 0]
⇒ E[ei|ei ≥ 0] =
x− Φ[− x√κ]E[ei|ei ≤ 0]
1− Φ[− x√κ] ,
where Φ[·] is the standard normal c.d.f. Thus, (10) can be re-written as
(11)
(
1− 2Φ[− x√κ])E[ei|ei ≤ 0] + x
1− Φ[− x√κ] > 0,
which holds as long as the numerator is positive. Note that
E[|ei|] = x− 2Φ
[− x√κ]E[ei|ei ≤ 0],
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and, from using the expectation of the folded normal we have that
E[ei|ei ≤ 0] =
xΦ[−x√κ]− 1√
κ
φ
[
x
√
κ
]
Φ
[− x√κ] ,
where φ[·] is the standard normal p.d.f. Thus, the numerator of (11) can be re-written as
2xΦ[−x√κ]− φ
[
x
√
κ
]
√
κ
− 2xΦ[−x√κ]2 + 2φ
[
x
√
κ
]
Φ[−x√κ]√
κ
Φ[−x√κ] ≡
Z(x
√
κ)
Φ[−x√κ] > 0,
which holds iff Z(x
√
κ) > 0 for x ∈ (0,∞) and κ ∈ [1,∞). Integration by parts gives:
Φ[−x√κ] = 1
2
− φ[x√κ](x+ x3
3
+
x5
5 · 3 +
x7
7 · 5 · 3 + . . .
)
=
1
2
− φ[x√κ]q(x)
which can be applied to Z(x
√
κ) to yield
Z(x
√
κ) =
x
2
− 2√
κ
φ
[
x
√
κ
]2
q(x)− 2xφ[x√κ]2q(x)2
=
x
2
− q(x)e
−κx2
pi
(
1√
κ
− xq(x)
)
.
Note that as κ ∈ [1,∞), then for a fixed x, Z(x√κ) is minimized at κ = 1. Thus, it is
sufficient to show that Z(x
√
1) = Z(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0,∞). We will now show there is
a single inflection point of Z(x), that is Z ′′(x∗) = 0 for a unique value of x∗ ∈ [0,∞),
and then use this to show that Z(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0,∞).
Using the fact that φ
[
x
]
q(x) = Φ
[
x
]− 12 , we can re-write
Z(x) =
x
2
− 2φ[x](Φ[x]− 1
2
)
− 2x
(
Φ
[
x
]− 1
2
)2
,
Z ′(x) =
1
2
− 2φ[x]2 − 2xφ[x](Φ[x]− 1
2
)
− 2
(
Φ
[
x
]− 1
2
)2
,
Z ′′(x) = 2(x2 − 3)φ[x](Φ[x]− 1
2
)
+ 2xφ
[
x
]2
, and
Z ′′′(x) = 2φ
[
x
](
x(5− x2)
(
Φ
[
x
]− 1
2
)
− (2 + x2)φ[x]) = 2φ[x]g(x).
We need bounds on Φ
[
x
]− 12 . As x > 0 we have
(12) Φ[x]− 1
2
=
∫ x
0
φ
[
y
]
dy >
∫ x
0
φ
[
x
]
dy = xφ
[
x
]
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which implies
Z ′′(x) < 2x(x2 − 2)φ[x]2 < 0 if x ∈ (0,√2]
and it is clear that Z ′′(x) > 0,∀x ∈ [√3,∞). Together this implies that Z ′′(x) = 0
somewhere in [
√
2,
√
3]. Note from the statement of Z ′′′(x) above that
sign(Z ′′′(x)) = sign(g(x)). Further, applying (12) we have that
g′′(x) = 10φ
[
x
]−8x2φ[x]−6x(Φ[x]− 1
2
)
< −14φ[x](x2 − 5
7
)
< 0 on [
√
2,
√
3].
As g(x) is concave on [
√
2,
√
3], this implies that
inf
x∈[√2,√3]
g(x) = min
{
g(
√
2), g(
√
3)
}
.
Using (12) we have
g(
√
2) = 3
√
2
(
Φ
[√
2
]− 1
2
)
− 4φ[√2] > 2φ[√2] > 0, and
g(
√
3) = 2
√
3
(
Φ
[√
3
]− 1
2
)
− 5φ[√3] > φ[√3] > 0.
As both are positive, this implies that Z ′′′(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [√2,√3], and this combined
with Z ′′(x) < 0,∀x ∈ [0,√2] and Z ′′(x) > 0,∀x ∈ [√3,∞) implies there is a unquie
x∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that Z ′′(x∗) = 0.
There are now two cases: Z ′(x∗) ≥ 0 or Z ′(x∗) < 0. First, consider Z ′(x∗) ≥ 0.
Note that Z(0) = 0, Z ′(0) = pi−22pi > 0, so if Z
′(x∗) ≥ 0, this implies that Z ′(x) >
0,∀x ∈ [0,∞), and thus Z(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0,∞), as desired.
If, on the other hand, Z ′(x∗) < 0, then the fact that lim
x→∞Z
′(x)→ 0 implies Z ′(x) <
0,∀x ∈ [x∗,∞) asZ ′′(x) > 0,∀x ∈ (x∗,∞). This, coupled with the fact that lim
x→∞Z(x)→
0, implies that Z(x∗) > 0 and Z(x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [x∗,∞). In addition, Z ′′(x) <
0,∀x ∈ [0, x∗) implies that inf
x∈[0,x∗]
Z(x) = min {Z(0), Z(x∗)} = Z(0) = 0. Thus,
Z(x) > 0,∀x ∈ (0,∞), as desired.
Thus (10) holds, and so too does (8), when bi = 0 for any n. The fact that the covari-
ance of a random variable that is a sum of random variables is linear in the covariances
of the individual random variables means that this will also hold when bi 6= 0 as bi is
independent of κi, and independently of n.
PROPOSITION 5: If x > 0 and ρ is large enough then cov[E , ni|Ii ≥ 0] > cov[E , ni|Ii ≤
0].2
2Simulations indicate this holds for all ρ > ρi. ρ close to one is needed for tractability.
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PROOF:
Set ρ = 1, which implies that ei⊥ni. We will use this fact to allow us to map this
proposition onto the proof of Proposition 4.
Fix n in that proof to n′ > maxn. Then each n here maps to a unique ρi in the proof
of Proposition 4. As nothing in that proof depends on the distribution of ρi, the result
follows immediately. As this proposition holds for ρ = 1, it will continue to hold as long
as ρ is close to one.
PROPOSITION 6: If ρ is large enough, then cov[E , κi − κ|ni] is increasing in ni.
PROOF:
Using (3), we have cov[E , κi−κ|ni] = cov
[
κi−κ,E[E|κi]|ni
]
. Note that κi−κ and
E[E|κi] are both functions of ni and ρi. Then, as ρi is distributed according to Fρi on
[ρ, ρ] (with ρ ≥ 0, and ρ < ρ), we have:
dcov
[
κi − κ,E[E|κi]|ni
]
dni
=
d
dni
∫ ρ
ρ
(
(κi − κ)E[E|κi]|ni
)
dFρi − E
[
E[E|κi]|ni
] d
dni
∫ ρ
ρ
(
κi − κ|ni
)
dFρi
− E[κi − κ|ni] d
dni
∫ ρ
ρ
(
E[E|κi]|ni
)
dFρi
=
∫ ρ
ρ
(
d(κi − κ)
dni
E[E|κi] + (κi − κ)dE[E|κi]
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi
− E[E[E|κi]|ni] ∫ ρ
ρ
(
d(κi − κ)
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi
− E[κi − κ|ni]
∫ ρ
ρ
(
dE[E|κi]
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi
=
∫ ρ
ρ
(
d(κi − κ)
dni
E[E|κi]
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi − E[E[E|κi]|ni] ∫ ρ
ρ
(
d(κi − κ)
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi
+
∫ ρ
ρ
(
(κi − κ)dE[E|κi]
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi − E[κi − κ|ni]∫ ρ
ρ
(
dE[E|κi]
dni
∣∣∣∣ni)dFρi
= cov
[
d(κi − κ)
dni
, E[E|κi]
∣∣∣∣ni]+ cov[κi − κ, dE[E|κi]dni
∣∣∣∣ni] .
Note that the proof of Proposition 2 gives that E[E|κi]|ni is increasing in κi, which is
decreasing in ρi, so E[E|κi]|ni is decreasing in ρi. Using the definition of κi − κ from
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Lemma 1 we also have that
d2(κi − κ)
dnidρi
=
1− ρi + ni(ρi − 2)
(1 + (ni − 1)ρi)3 < 0.
So E[E|κi] and d(κi−κ)dni are decreasing in ρi. By Lemma 2,
cov
[
d(κi − κ)
dni
, E[E|κi]
∣∣∣ni] > 0.
For the second covariance above: from the definition of κi and κ in Lemma 1, we have
that κi − κ is decreasing in ρi. Substituting these definitions into (4), we have
µ =
nx
n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi) and σ
2 =
µ2
κx2
+
1
τb
we have that I|κi, ni ∼ N
[
µ, 1
σ2
]
, and E|κi, ni is a folded normal with mean given by
(5), which is a function of µ and σ. We thus can write:
dE[E|κi]
dni
=
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
· dσ
dni
+
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
· dµ
dni
d2E[E|κi]
dnidρi
=
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
)
· dσ
dni
+
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
· d
2σ
dnidρi
(13)
+
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
)
· dµ
dni
+
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
· d
2µ
dnidρi
.
We will now show that (13) is negative. Starting with the second term note that when
ρ = 1:
d2σ2
dnidρi
= 2σ
d2σ
dnidρi
+ 2
dσ
dρi
· dσ
dni
, thus,
d2σ
dnidρi
=
1
2σ
(
d2σ2
dnidρi
− 2 dσ
dρi
· dσ
dni
)
=
1
2σ
(
−2nτ(2τ(n− 1)(1− ρi) + n(1 + τ))
(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))4
+2
n2τ(n− 1) · nτ(1− ρi)
σ2(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))6
)
<
nτ
σ
(−n2(2τ(n− 1)(1− ρi) + n(1 + τ)) + n2τ(n− 1)(1− ρi)
σ2(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))6
)
= −nτ
σ
(
n2(τ(n− 1)(1− ρi) + n(1 + τ))
σ2(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))6
)
< 0,
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where the inequality comes from setting 1/τb = 0 in the definition of σ2. Further, from
(7) we have ∂E[E|κi]∂σ > 0, so the second term of (13) is negative. Next for the fourth
term:
d2µ
dnidρi
= −τ(n− 1)(1− ρi) + n(1 + τ)
(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))3 x
and from (7) we have that ∂E[E|κi]∂µ > 0 if x > 0, and negative if x < 0. Therefore the
fourth term of (13) is negative (or zero when x = 0).
We now show that the first and third terms of (13) are, together, negative. First, we
examine the first term, defining c = µ/x, and using the expression for ∂E[E|κi]∂σ from (7):
dσ
dρi
=
dσ
dµ
· dµ
dρi
=
µ
κσx2
· dµ
dρi
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
)
=
∂2E[E|κi]
(∂σ)2
· dσ
dρi
+
∂2E[E|κi]
∂σ∂µ
· dµ
dρi
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
· µ
σ2
·
(
µ
σ
dσ
dρi
− dµ
dρi
)
= −2φ
[µ
σ
]
· µ
σ2
· dµ
dρi
·
(
1− µ
2
σ2x2
)
= −2φ
[µ
σ
]
· µ
σ2
· dµ
dρi
·
(
κ
c2τb + κ
)
.
And now the third term using the expression for ∂E[E|κi]∂µ from (7):
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
)
=
∂2E[E|κi]
(∂µ)2
· dµ
dρi
+
∂2E[E|κi]
∂σ∂µ
· dσ
dρi
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
· 1
σ
·
(
dµ
dρi
− µ
σ
dσ
dρi
)
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
· 1
σ
· dµ
dρi
·
(
κ
c2τb + κ
)
.
Deriving a few more quantities:
dσ
dni
=
dσ
dµ
· dµ
dni
=
µ
σx2
· dµ
dni
,
dµ
dρi
= − nτ(n− 1)x
(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))2 = −
c2τ(n− 1)x
n
, and
dµ
dni
=
τ(1− ρi)x
(n(1 + ρiτ) + τ(1− ρi))2 =
c2τ(1− ρi)x
n2
,
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which we plug in to show that the first and third term of (13) together are:
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂σ
)
· dσ
dni
+
d
dρi
(
∂E[E|κi]
∂µ
)
· dµ
dni
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
· 1
σ
· dµ
dρi
·
(
κ
c2τb + κ
)
·
(
dµ
dni
− µ
σ
dσ
dni
)
= 2φ
[µ
σ
]
· 1
σ
·
(
κ
c2τb + κ
)2
· dµ
dρi
· dµ
dni
= −2φ
[µ
σ
]
·
(
κ
c2τb + κ
)2
· c
4τ2x2(n− 1)(1− ρi)
σn3
< 0.
This implies that d
2E[E|κi]
dnidρi
< 0. Thus, both κi − κ and dE[E|κi]dni are decreasing in ρi,
and so Lemma 2 gives that cov
[
κi − κ, dE[E|κi]dni
∣∣∣ni] > 0. This implies that ddni cov[κi−
κ,E[E|κi]|ni] > 0, as desired. Note that ρ = 1 is needed only to ensure the negativity
of the second term, so if ρ < 1, the overall expression will still be negative. (Simula-
tions indicate that any parameter values compatible with Implication 2 are sufficient to
guarantee the negativity of the second term.)
PROPOSITION 7: Conditional on n:
(i) More ideologically extreme citizens are more likely to turn out to vote.
(ii) Conditional on overconfidence, more ideologically extreme citizens are more likely
to turn out.
(iii) More overconfident citizens are more likely to turn out, both conditional on, and
independent of, ideological extremeness.
If ρ is large then these predictions also hold independent of n.
COROLLARY 1: Conditional on n, strength of partisan identification is increasing in
overconfidence, both conditional on, and independent of, ideological extremeness. More-
over, strength of partisan identification is increasing in ideological extremeness, both
conditional on, and independent of, overconfidence. If ρ is large enough, these results
hold independent of n.
PROOF:
Fix ni = n and consider an individual i with ideology I, overconfidence κi, and
preference bias bi. Suppose, without loss of generality that Ii > 0. Note that Ei[x] =
Ii − bi. This means that we have UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x) if and only if x > −bi. Thus,
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Probi[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)] = Probi[x > −bi] = 1− Probi[x < −bi]. By construction
this is equal to
(14) 1− Φ[(−bi − (Ii − bi))√τ + κi] = Φ[Ii√τ + κi] .
As Ii > 0, Ii
√
τ + κi must be strictly increasing in κi conditional on Ii, and in Ii
conditional on κi. The same must therefore hold for Φ[Ii
√
τ + κi] , and hence for
Probi[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)]. Note that specular results hold conditional on Ii < 0.
Thus, we can replace Ii with Ei = |Ii| in (14).
Finally, Fc(·) and F ′c(·) are c.d.f.s and thus increasing in their arguments. This, to-
gether with the previous argument gives the second and third parts of the proposition
and corollary, conditional on n. This, combined with Proposition 2 gives the first part of
Proposition 7 and Corollary 1, and the third part of 7 independent of n.
Consider n ∼ Fn. Suppose ρ = 1, so κ = 1 for all citizens. Then, more overconfi-
dent citizens, those with greater κi − κ, will be more confident (greater κi). This gives
that, conditional on ideology, more overconfident citizens are more likely to turn out.
Moreover, those with the same level of overconfidence will have the same confidence, so
more ideological citizens will be more likely to turn out, conditional on overconfidence.
This, combined with Proposition 2 gives the first part of Proposition 7 and Corollary 1
independent of n. These would continue to hold for ρ large enough, as in Implication 2.
PROPOSITION 8:
(i) Vi(κi|ni) is increasing in κi.
(ii) n∗i is increasing in the degree of correlational neglect.
PROOF:
The utility of taking action a after receiving n signals is:
−
∫
(a− bi − x)2dFi[x] = −(a− bi − Ei[x])2 − vari[x|n]
so the value of an additional signal is:
Vi(κi|n) = vari[x|n]− vari[x|n+1]
=
1 + (n− 1)ρi
n+ τ(1 + (n− 1)ρi) −
1 + nρi
n+ 1 + τ(1 + nρi)
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and plugging in for ρi = n−κi(n−1)κi from Lemma 1 we have:
Vi(κi|n) = κi(κi − 1)
(κi + τ)(n2(κi + τ)− κi(1 + τ))
dVi(κi|n)
dκi
=
n2τ2(κi − 1) + κ2i (n2 − 1)(1 + 2τ) + κiτ2(n2 − κi)
(κi + τ)2(n2(κi + τ)− κi(1 + τ))2 > 0
where the sign of the last line follows from 1 < κi ≤ n, as n ≥ 2 and ρi ∈ [0, 1).
We have that n∗i is determined by
arg max
ni
− (a− bi − Ei[x])2 − vari[x|ni]− cni ⇒ dvari[x|n
∗
i ]
dn
= −c
and thus n∗i is defined implicitly by
1− ρi
(n∗i + τ(1 + (n
∗
i − 1)ρi))2
− c = 0
and using the implicit function theorem we have
dn∗i
dρi
= −τ(n
∗
i − 1)(1− ρi) + n∗i (1 + τ)
2(1− ρi)(1 + ρiτ) < 0
so n∗i is increasing in correlational neglect ρ− ρi.
PROPOSITION 9: When citizen i is told the ideology of citizen j, and she believes
κj = κ:
(i) The ideology of citizen i after communication is αiIi + βiIj for some αi, βi ∈
R++, where αi is increasing in κi and βi is decreasing in κi.
(ii) If Ij 6= (Ii−bi) κκ+τ , then i’s mean belief about the extremeness of j’s preferences
is increasing in i’s level of overconfidence d|Ei[bj ]|dκi > 0.
PROOF:
The posterior of citizen i about the bias of citizen j after observing Ij is:
L(bj |Ij) ∝ L(Ij |bj)L(bj)
∝
[∫ +∞
−∞
exp
{
−κ
2
(
x− κ+ τ
κ
(Ij − b)
)2}
∗ exp
{
− κi + τ
2
(x− Ii)2
}
dx
]
∗ exp
{
−τbb
2
j
2
}
.
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This is a normal distribution with mean(
Ij κ+ τ
κ
− (Ii − bi)
)
∗ κ(κi + τ)(κ+ τ)
(κ+ τ) (τ2 + τκ+ τbκ) + κi (τ2 + 2τκ+ κτb + κ2)
where the second term is positive and increasing in κi. Thus, if Ij > (Ii − bi)
(
κ
κ+τ
)
,
then Ei[bj ] > 0 and Ei[bj ] is increasing in κi. If Ij < (Ii − bi)
(
κ
κ+τ
)
, then Ei[bj ] < 0
and Ei[bj ] is decreasing in κi. Thus, |Ei[bj ]| is increasing in κi.
The existence of αi, βi ∈ R++ s.t. the ideology of citizen i after communication is
αiIi + βiIj is a standard result of Bayesian updating. αi + βi 6= 1 because ideology is
a signal of both bias and beliefs. The fact that αi increases and βi decreases in κi is a
direct consequence of the standard result that citizens with a high prior precision update
less, and also because here they will tend to assign a higher probability to the fact that
the differences in ideologies are due to differences in preference biases. In particular,
solving for αi, βi ∈ R+:
αi =
(κi + τ)
(
τ2 + 2τκ+ κτb + κ
2
)
(κ+ τ) (τ2 + τκ+ τbκ) + κi (τ2 + 2τκ+ κτb + κ2)
, βi =
κ(1− αi)
κ+ τ
and thus
dαi
dκi
=
τbκ
2(τbκ+ (κ+ τ)
2)
(κi + τ)(κ+ τ)2 + τbκ(κi + κ+ τ)2
> 0.
Thus, αi is increasing in κi, so βi is decreasing in κi.
PROPOSITION 10: Suppose bi = 0, ∀i. When citizen i is told the ideology of citizen j:
(i) The ideology of citizen i after communication is γiIi+δiIj for some γi, δi ∈ R++,
where γi is increasing in κi and δi is decreasing in κi.
(ii) Ei[κj ] is increasing in κi if i and j are on opposite sides of the aisle, (Ii ∗ Ij < 0)
or if j is more ideological extreme than i (Ej > Ei).
(iii) Ei[κj ] is decreasing in κi if i and j are on the same side of the aisle (Ii ∗ Ij > 0),
and Ei > τ+κκ Ej .
PROOF:
We begin with the second and third parts of the proposition. By Bayes’ rule: L(κj |Ij) ∝
L(Ij |κj)L(κj). Note that L(Ij |κj) = φIi,κi+τ
(Ij( τ+κjκj )), where φµ,τ (·) denotes the
p.d.f. of a normal distribution with mean µ and precision τ . To prove that Ei[κj ] is in-
creasing in κi, it is sufficient to prove that, for any κj , κ′j ∈ supp(F ), κj < κ′j , the
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ratio
L(Ij |κ′j)
L(Ij |κj) =
√
κi+τ
2pi exp
{
− (κi+τ)2
(
Ij
(
τ+κ′j
κ′j
)
− Ii
)2}
√
κi+τ
2pi exp
{
− (κi+τ)2
(
Ij
(
τ+κj
κj
)
− Ii
)2}
= exp
−κi + τ2
(Ij (τ + κ′j
κ′j
)
− Ii
)2
−
(
Ij
(
τ + κj
κj
)
− Ii
)2
is increasing in κi. This holds if and only if
(15)
(
Ij
(
τ + κ′j
κ′j
)
− Ii
)2
<
(
Ij
(
τ + κj
κj
)
− Ii
)2
for all κj , κ′j ∈ supp(F ), κj < κ′j . If the converse of (15) holds for all κj , κ′j ∈
supp(F ), κj < κ′j , this is sufficient for Ei[κj ] to be decreasing in κi.
As τ+κjκj is decreasing in κj , Ej(
τ+κ′j
κ′j
) < Ej( τ+κjκj ) since κj < κ′j . This implies (15)
holds if Ii ∗ Ij < 0 or Ej > Ei. By contrast, the converse holds if κj , κ′j ∈ supp(F ),
κj < κ
′
j if Ii ∗ Ij > 0, and Ei > τ+κκ Ej .
Finally, as in the Proof of Proposition 9, the first part follows from standard properties
of Bayesian Updating.
B. Survey Details
The typical way psychologists measure overconfidence is not well suited to surveys.
They often use a very large number of questions—up to 150 (see, for example, Alpert
and Raiffa, 1969/1982; Soll and Klayman, 2004)—and elicit confidence using confidence
intervals, which may be difficult for the average survey respondent to understand (see,
for example, Juslin, Wennerholm and Olsson, 1999; Rothschild, 2012).
Our methodology for measuring overconfidence on surveys uses three innovations.
The first two are due to Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2014). First, the ques-
tions we use are about either quantities that everyone knows the scale of, such as dates, or
the scale is provided, as in the case of unemployment or inflation. That is, when asking
about unemployment rates, the question gives respondents the historical minimum, max-
imum, and median of that rate. This has been shown to reduce the number of incorrect
answers simply due to a respondent not knowing the appropriate scale (Ansolabehere,
Meredith and Snowberg, 2013). Second, confidence is elicited on a qualitative scale,
which is easily understandably by survey respondents and allows for more conservative
controls for actual knowledge.
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The third innovation is a modification of the second, and was only utilized on the 2011
CCES. For our general knowledge questions—the year the telephone was invented, the
population of Spain, the year Shakespeare was born, and the percent of the U.S. popu-
lation that lives in California—we elicited confidence using an inverted confidence in-
terval.3 That is, rather than asking for a confidence interval directly, which we felt may
have been too challenging for survey respondents, we asked them to give their estimates
of the probability that the true answer was in some interval around their answer. So, for
example, after giving their best guess as to the date of Shakespeare’s birth, respondents
were asked:
What do you think the percent chance is that your best guess, entered above,
is within 50 years of the actual answer?
Given a two-parameter distribution, such as a normal, this is enough to pin down the
variance of a respondent’s belief.
The sum total of these innovations is that overconfidence can be elicited using a small
number of questions that are understandable to most survey respondents, rather than just
to university undergraduates.
B.1. Survey Questions
We next present the text of the questions used to construct our overconfidence measure
on the 2010 and 2011 CCES, as described in Section IIB. Instructions in brackets indicate
limitations on possible answers implemented by the survey company—these were not
displayed to respondents. If a survey respondent tried to enter, say, text where only a
positive number was allowed, they would be told to edit their entry to conform with the
limitations placed on the response field. If a respondent tried to skip a question, the
survey would request that the respondent give an answer. If the respondent tried to skip
the same question a second time, they were allowed to do so.
1. The unemployment rate is the percent of people actively searching work but not
presently employed. Since World War II it has ranged from a low of 2 percent to a
high of 11 percent.
What is your best guess about the unemployment rate in the United States today?
Even if you are uncertain, please provide us with your best estimate of the percent
of people seeking work but currently without a job in the United States.
% [only allow a positive number]
2. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
3Note that these general knowledge questions were all from previous research on overconfidence.
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• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
3. The inflation rate is the annual percentage change in prices for basic goods like
food, clothing, housing, and energy. Since World War II it has ranged from a
high of 14 percent (a 14% increase in prices over the previous year) to a low of -2
percent (a 2% decline in prices over the previous year).
What is your best guess about the inflation rate in the United States today? Even if
you are uncertain, please provide us with your best estimate of about what percent
do you think prices went up or down in the last 12 months.
Do you think prices went up or down?
• Up
• Down
4. By what percent do you think prices went up or down?
% [only allow a positive number]
5. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
6. The unemployment rate is the percent of people actively searching work but not
presently employed. Since World War II it has ranged from a low of 2 percent to a
high of 11 percent.
What do you expect the unemployment rate to be a year from now? Even if you
are uncertain, please provide us with your best estimate of the percent of people
who will be seeking but without a job in the United States in November, 2011.
% [only allow a positive number]
7. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
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• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
8. The inflation rate is the annual percentage change in prices for basic goods like
food, clothing, housing, and energy. Since World War II it has ranged from a
high of 14 percent (a 14% increase in prices over the previous year) to a low of -2
percent (a 2% decline in prices over the previous year).
What do you expect the inflation rate to be a year from now? Even if you are
uncertain, please provide us with your best estimate of about what percent do you
expect prices to go up or down in the next 12 months.
Do you expect prices to go up or down?
• Up
• Down
9. By what percent do you expect prices to go up or down?
% [only allow a positive number]
10. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
Next, we list the questions from the 2011 CCES used to construct the overconfidence
measures discussed in Section VIA. Note that the unemployment questions were changed
from 2010, in accordance with the evolving research agenda of Ansolabehere, Meredith
and Snowberg.
1. In what year was the telephone invented? Even if you are not sure, please give us
your best guess.
2. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
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• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
3. As a different way of answering the previous question, what do you think the
percent chance is that your best guess, entered above, is within 25 years of the
actual answer?
%
4. What is the population of Spain, in millions? Even if you are not sure, please give
us your best guess.
5. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
6. As a different way of answering the previous question, what do you think the
percent chance is that your best guess, entered above, is within 15 million of the
actual answer?
%
7. In what year was the playwright William Shakespeare born? Even if you are not
sure, please give us your best guess.
%
8. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
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9. As a different way of answering the previous question, what do you think the
percent chance is that your best guess, entered above, is within 50 years of the
actual answer?
%
10. What percent of the US population lives in California? Even if you are not sure,
please give us your best guess.
11. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
12. As a different way of answering the previous question, what do you think the
percent chance is that your best guess, entered above, is within 5 percentage points
of the actual answer?
%
13. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, since World War II the most non-
agricultural jobs the US economy has lost in a year is 5.4 million. The most jobs
gained in a year has been 4.2 million. Over the same period, the US economy has
gained an average of 1.4 million jobs a year.
What is your best guess about the number of jobs gained or lost in the last year?
Over the past year, I think the US economy has overall
• Lost jobs
• Gained jobs
14. How many jobs do you think have been lost or gained over the past year?
million jobs [only allow a positive number]
15. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
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• Very confident
• Certain
16. The inflation rate is the annual percentage change in prices for basic goods like
food, clothing, housing, and energy. Since World War II it has ranged from a high
of 14.4. percent (a 14.4% increase in prices over the previous year) to a low of -1.2
percent (a 1.2% decline in prices over the previous year).
What is your best guess about the inflation rate in the United States today?
Do you think prices went up or down?
• Up
• Down
17. By what percent do you think prices went up or down?
% [only allow a positive number]
18. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
19. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, since World War II the most non-
agricultural jobs the US economy has lost in a year is 5.4 million. The most jobs
gained in a year has been 4.2 million. Over the same period, the US economy has
gained an average of 1.4 million jobs a year.
What is your best guess about the number of jobs that will be gained or lost over
the next year?
Over the next year, I think the US economy will overall
• Lose jobs
• Gain jobs
20. How many jobs do you think the US economy will lose or gain over the next year?
million jobs [only allow a positive number]
21. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
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• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
22. The inflation rate is the annual percentage change in prices for basic goods like
food, clothing, housing, and energy. Since World War II it has ranged from a high
of 14.4. percent (a 14.4% increase in prices over the previous year) to a low of -1.2
percent (a 1.2% decline in prices over the previous year).
What do you expect the inflation rate to be a year from now?
Do you expect prices to go up or down?
• Up
• Down
23. By what percent do you expect prices to go up or down?
% [only allow a positive number]
24. How confident are you of your answer to this question?
• No confidence at all
• Not very confident
• Somewhat unconfident
• Somewhat confident
• Very confident
• Certain
C. Additional Theoretical Specifications
This section addresses, in a casual way, a number of theoretical questions that have
been posed to us. While the result of our inquiry into these questions did not produce
results that merit a discussion in the main text, we thought it would be useful to record
the results.
Distributional Assumptions.—Throughout the paper we make heavy use of normal
distributions. This has advantages for both tractability and interpretation. In particular,
tractability is helped by the fact that a normal is a self-conjugate prior, and that properties
of the normal are well studied in statistics. The advantage in interpretation comes from
the fact that the normal is a two-parameter distribution (the mean and precision), so it
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is straightforward to implement and interpret overconfidence as a function of precision
without worrying about the effects of higher (or lower) order moments.
However, this leads to questions about how much our results are driven by the use of
normal distributions. Or, conversely, many seminar attendees have conjectured that it
would be straight-forward to extend our results to well-behaved distributions. Here we
give some guidance on this subject.
We start by discussing how our results might generalize to other distributions. Without
the normal distribution, the correlational neglect model becomes intractable. The value
of this model is that it allows us to make predictions about the role of the number of sig-
nals that could not be obtained under any fully Bayesian model, as discussed in Section
IIIA.
However if one is willing to put aside these predictions, it is possible to discuss the
role of the normal when citizens receive uncorrelated signals they over-interpret (as in
the “model” of Lemma 1). The proof of Proposition 2 relies on the fact that both over-
confidence and extremeness are increasing in correlational neglect. Intuitively this seems
as though it would hold for a wide range of distributions (at least when x = 0), but it
is quite difficult to show this analytically. Using the normal distribution, then, gives two
advantages: tractability, as just discussed, and clarity, as unique among commonly used
multi-variate conjugate distributions the variance-covariance matrix is a parameter. This
makes the definition of correlational neglect very clear as it does not require tweaking
other parameters of the distribution. Indeed, while we have verified that our primary re-
sult holds when priors are distributed according to a Beta (or uniform) distribution, and
signals are Bernoulli, the interpretation of even this simple model is much more difficult.
If one uses a support with only two possible states, then our results may not always
hold. However, it is known that such a setup (without overconfidence) produces per-
verse results: see McMurray (2013). In particular, with only two states, the precision of
beliefs may decrease, rather than increase with more signals. However, this would be
inconsistent empirical results in Section IIIA.
Multi-Dimensional Issue Spaces.—Our theory has implications for how ideology on
different dimensions would be related to overconfidence. For example, if the information
on a given dimension were all public, with agreed upon correlational structure, then
there should be no relationship between ideology and overconfidence on that dimension.
While this implication is straight-forward to work out, we did not feel that it was testable
with current data.
In particular, in order to test this, one would need to know quite a bit about where
citizens get their data from, and how citizens infer about how this data affects them. For
example, even if most economic information is public, how that information relates to
a citizen’s permanent income is more opaque. Learning about that relationship would
entail seeing how nationwide economic performance seemed to affect a citizen’s own
employment situation. As these very personal signals would have an unknown correla-
tional structure, there is plenty of room for correlational neglect.
Likewise, positions on a social issue like gay marriage may appear to have no informa-
24 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARY 2013
tional content at all, and hence, there should be no relationship between overconfidence
and ideology on this dimension. However, it is perfectly reasonable that one’s position
on gay marriage may depend on beliefs about the likelihood that a loved one, say a child,
is gay. This likelihood may be drawn, in part, from the number of openly gay people in
a citizen’s social environment. If a citizen neglects the fact that they live in a religious
community where others are not open about their sexuality, then they will tend to un-
derestimate the probability that a loved may turn out to be gay. This will lead to both
overconfidence and more extreme positions, as before.
We believe that applying our theory to multi-dimensional spaces would be interesting,
and possibly fruitful. We refrain from doing so in this paper because it does not add to
the predictions we can test in our data.
Other Dimensions of Personality.—We treat correlational neglect as akin to a person-
ality trait, which has raised questions of how this might be related to other personality
traits. In particular, previous research has found that overconfidence is related to the
extraversion of the “Big Five” personality inventory (Schaefer et al., 2004), although
Moore and Healy (2007) has found that it is orthogonal to all traits in the Big Five. Re-
gardless, extraversion does not have any significant explanatory power for the political
behaviors we consider here (Gerber et al., 2010, 2012). Other studies have noted a link
between overconfidence and narcissism. Little is known about the relationship between
narcissism and political behavior, nor are there formal theories (that we are aware of)
that relate narcissism to decision making more generally.
C.1. Rational Models of Voting
Our model of voter turnout, and partisan identification, is based on a specific form of
expressive voting (Fiorina, 1976; Brennan and Hamlin, 1998). In particular a citizen i
votes if and only if
(C1)
∣∣∣∣Probi[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)]− 12
∣∣∣∣− ci > 0,
where ci is an i.i.d. draw from some distribution Fc, which is strictly increasing on
(
0, 12
)
.
In addition ci⊥(ρi, bi, eit).
While any political economy model where turnout is exogenous implicitly uses an
expressive voting model (and others use it more explicitly, see Knight, 2013), there are a
number of other approaches in the political economy literature. As each approach has its
partisans, we thought it worthwhile to discuss those models, and show, where possible,
how our model relates to them.
Before discussing alternative models, we should note that we focused on the expressive
approach because we believe it is correct, and because it is compatible (as shown below)
with a promising approach in the literature, that voters are choice- or regret-avoidant
(Matsusaka, 1995; Degan and Merlo, 2011; Degan, 2013).
In addition, this modeling approach allows for both non-trivial turnout and strong par-
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tisan identification even if the policies proposed by political parties are similar to each
other, as seems to be the case in reality (Snowberg, Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2007a,b).
This is generally not possible in more traditional models. To make this specific, suppose
that both parties propose very similar platforms, and consider a citizen who is very con-
fident that the best policy for her is proposed by party R. According to our model, this
citizen would strongly identify with, and turn out to vote, for party R. However, if these
behaviors were rooted in expected utility, and the parties espoused similar platforms, this
would not hold. For any reasonably smooth utility function there is a small difference in
utility between the two parties—and hence no reason to strongly identify with one party
or the other, or turnout.
Pivotal Voting.—In these models, the turnout decision is driven largely by whether or
not a voter is likely to be pivotal—that is, change the outcome of the election (Riker and
Ordeshook, 1968). In this model a citizen turns out to vote if and only if
(C2) pBi − Ci +Di > 0
where p is the probability an individual citizen’s vote is pivotal—that is, changes the win-
ner of the election—and Bi is the benefit to the citizen of the citizen’s favored candidate
winning over the other candidate. The remaining terms, Ci and Di, are the instrumental
costs and benefits of voting, which are unrelated to the outcome of the election.
It seems reasonable to assume that more-overconfident citizens would over-estimate
their probability of being pivotal. This would lead to the prediction that more overconfi-
dent citizens would be more likely to turnout.
However, whether or not more ideologically extreme people are more likely to turn out
will depend on their utility function. It is well known in the literature on pivotal voting
than in order for more ideologically extreme people to be more likely to turn out, utilities
need to be very concave: that is, they care much more about small differences in policy
when those policies are very far away from their ideal, than when those policies are close
to them. Adding overconfidence adds some additional issues: in particular, in order to
have more extreme citizens be more likely to turn out the utility function has to be more
concave than a quadratic loss function. We have examined a quartic loss function, and
even this degree of concavity will not guarantee the result: it holds only for specific
parameters and values of the fourth moment of the distribution of beliefs.
Finally, we do not know if it is possible to replicate our conditional predictions about
the role of overconfidence and extremeness using a pivotal voter model. As such, it
seems that turning in our model for a pivotal voter model would be a poor choice.
Group Utilitarian.—In the group-utilitarian framework a citizen votes not just because
voting may improve her utility, but because it will improve the utility of others like her
as well (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). In these models there
is heterogeneity in the costs of voting, and this selects who, from a group, actually turns
out. In order to use our model of overconfidence, there needs to be a mapping from
beliefs to the cost of voting. An expression for the cost of voting like the left-hand-side
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of (C1) works, and once this is nested in the group-utilitarian framework will produce the
same comparative statics as in Proposition 7. This occurs because in the group utilitarian
framework those with the lowest costs of voting vote (up to some threshold), and the
overconfident, and ideologically extreme, have the lowest costs according to (C1). While
it would have been possible to use the full group-utilitarian framework in Section IVB,
we felt that, for concision, it was best to avoid that machinery and show directly the
important assumption that gives the predictions in that section.
C.2. Behavioral Models of Voting
The remaining two models we discuss—like the expressive voting model—focus on
the idiosyncratic costs and benefits of turning out to vote. In particular, they focus on
large elections where the number of voters grows large, and hence, pi → 0.
Regret-Avoidance.—Matsusaka (1995) argues that voter turnout is driven in part by
whether citizens anticipate they will regret their vote. We view this theory as descrip-
tively accurate: indeed, we ran a survey on a convenience sample using Mechanical
Turk, and found that over 60 percent of respondents reported that they took into account
whether they might regret their vote when deciding whether or not to vote. Almost 40
percent could name someone they regretted voting for.4
It is straightforward to show that our model is consistent with a model of regret-
avoidant voting. In particular, as pi → 0, a citizen’s turnout decision depends only
on the idiosyncratic, instrumental costs and benefits of voting in (C1), Ci and Di. We
decompose the instrumental cost into two parts: direct costs C ′i, such as the opportu-
nity cost of going to vote, and a regret penalty Ri that accrues if the citizen votes for a
candidate whose platform turns out to be worse for the citizen, given the state. That is
Di − Ci ≡ Di −RiIvote=wrong − C ′i
with Di, Ri and C ′i i.i.d. draws from some (possibly different) distributions.5 We then
have:
PROPOSITION C1: In large elections whenDi−Ci ≡ Di−RiIvote=wrong−C ′i, com-
parative statics on voter turnout and partisan identification are the same as comparative
statics on ∣∣∣∣Probi[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)]− 12
∣∣∣∣− ci > 0.
PROOF:
4For more on regret-avoidance, see Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002), Zeelenberg (1999), Zeelenberg, Inman and
Pieters (2001). Models of regret have then been frequently used to explain behavioral patterns which are not compatible
with standard, expected-utility, models (Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1987; Sugden,
1993; and Sarver, 2008). Indeed, Matsusaka’s approach is a direct instantiation of Sugden (1993), applied to politics.
5We emphasize that, although we pick a particular formalization, (expected) regret can be seen as either a reduction
in the benefit of voting, or an increase in the cost of voting.
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When elections are large p → 0 in (C2). Supposing citizen i favors candidate R if he
or she were to vote, citizen i will vote if and only if
Di −RiE[Ivote=wrong]− C ′i > 0
Prob[vote = wrong] <
Di − C ′i
Ri
1− Prob[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)] < Di − C
′
i
Ri
Prob[UR(bi|x) > UL(bi|x)]− 1
2
>
1
2
− Di − C
′
i
Ri ≡ ci.
The absolute value follows from considering the case where i favors candidate L.
We chose to display this chain of logic here to simplify and shorten exposition in the
text.
Choice-Avoidance.—Degan and Merlo (2011) use the same idea as Matsusaka (1995).
However, they note that as it is unlikely that a citizen will discover the actual state, they
will not anticipate regretting their decision; instead, they discuss their model in terms of
choice-avoidance. It should be clear from the form of (C1) that citizens who make their
voting decision in this way are choice-avoidant. In particular, a citizen avoids choice
unless the choice is clear.6
C.3. Strength of Partisan Identification
Our initial model of strength of partisan identification assumed that citizens would
invest in a partisan identity only if they believed there was a sufficiently high probability
that they would stay on the same side of the ideological spectrum as they received more
signals.
This yields the same predictions as Corollary 1. More overconfident citizens would
believe that, with high-probability, future signals would just confirm what they already
knew. As such, there is little chance that they would end up on the opposite side of
the ideological spectrum. Thus, more-overconfident citizens would be more likely to
strongly identify with a party.
More ideologically extreme citizens would know that they would need a more extreme
signal that the state is on the other side of the ideological spectrum in order to cross-over
to that side. As such, there is little chance they would end up on the opposite side, and
they would thus be more likely to strongly identify with a party.
We removed this additional model from the text of the paper in order to simplify and
shorten the exposition.
6For examples of choice avoidance in other contexts see Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang (2004), Iyengar and Lepper
(2000), Boatwright and Nunes (2001), Shah and Wolford (2007), Schwartz (2004), Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009),
DellaVigna (2009), Reutskaja and Hogarth (2009), and Bertrand et al. (2010).
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FIGURE D1. AGE, OVERCONFIDENCE, AND IDEOLOGY
Note: Each point is the average for three years of age. Trendiness, in black, and 95 percent confidence intervals, in gray,
use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 8.
D. Additional Empirical Specifications
In the text we present our preferred specifications. Here we provide additional specifi-
cations that we excluded from the text for concision. Please note that our
working paper, Ortoleva and Snowberg (2013), contains even more alternative specifica-
tions, including alternative ideology measures, extremism measures that are constructed
directly from ideology without first controlling for economic variables, demographic
controls, and unweighted specifications. The results in all cases are similar.
A feature of the theory that we do not emphasize in the text, is that our model predicts
that many of the relationships in the data should be monotonic. For example, the in-
crease in overconfidence with media exposure and age should be monotonic. Moreover,
the relationship between overconfidence and (average) extremeness, and overconfidence
and (average) ideology (when x > 0) should both be monotonically increasing relation-
ships. We do not discuss those results in the text because the econometrics of testing for
monotonicity is still in its infancy (see Patton and Timmermann, 2010, 2012). As such,
we prefer to show graphical representations of some of these monotonic relationships.
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The relationships in Figure 1 appear monotonic. The same graphs for age are found
in Figure D1. Figure D2 shows the relationship between overconfidence and ideology,
and overconfidence and extremeness. Once again, these relationships appear monotonic.
Figure D3 shows the results in Table 5 graphically. These results also appear monotonic,
and you can see the lower slope in the left-hand graphs (for the covariance to the left of
center) than those in the right-hand graphs.
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FIGURE D2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OVERCONFIDENCE AND EXTREMENESS, AND OVERCONFIDENCE AND
IDEOLOGY APPEARS TO BE MONOTONIC.
Note: Each point is the average for a decile of overconfidence, or three years of age. Trendiness, in black, and 95 percent
confidence intervals, in gray, use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 0.5.
Finally, we show the regression results for all three—including the two alternate—
measures of ideology that Table 4 is based on. As can be seen, the patterns in Table 3
are also found in the alternative measures. Indeed, in most cases, the results using the
alternative measures are stronger.
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